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1. Jason Waltrip, Note, The Russian Oil and Gas Industry after Yukos:
Outlook for Foreign Investment, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 575, 581
(2008). The Yukos Arbitration, with over $100 billion in dispute according to
lawyers for the claimants, is considered the largest international arbitration
case in history. See Emmanuel Gaillard et al., Yukos Majority Shareholders
Win the First Phase of their US$100 Billion Compensation Claims against
Russia, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP NEWS, available at http://www.shearman
.com/Yukos-Majority-Shareholders-Win-the-First-Phase-of-their-US100-BillionCompensation-Claims-Against-Russia/ (last visited April 2, 2010).
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Though only a first step towards a final judgment against
Russia, the 2009 Yukos Interim Awards on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility were the first decisions made against the nation
in an Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) arbitration.1 Russia
never formally ratified the ECT, a multilateral treaty
intended to promote and protect energy-related investments

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 189 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

7_LAIDLAW FINAL.DOC FINAL

656

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

3/15/2012 9:05:58 PM

[Vol. 52

04/16/2012 17:10:32

2. Matthew Parish and Charles Rosenberg, An Introduction to the Energy
Charter Treaty, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 191, 191 (2009).
3. See id. at 198 n.37.
4. Alex M. Niebruegge, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter
Treaty: The Yukos Arbitration and the Future Place of Provisional Application
in International Law, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 357 (2007).
5. Elliot Glusker, Arbitration Hurdles Facing Foreign Investors in Russia:
Analysis of Present Issues and Implications, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 595, 615
(2010).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part I.C.
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worldwide, though it did initially sign the agreement before it
floundered in the Duma, its legislature, awaiting final entry
into force.2 The ECT contains a controversial provision that
authorizes the treaty’s provisional application and enforces
the substantive provisions of the treaty before its formal
ratification.3 The Yukos Tribunal faced the issue of how to
use the ECT’s provisional application clause during a dispute
raised after Russia nationalized a highly-profitable energy
company owned by foreign investors, and the investors
subsequently initiated an arbitration proceeding under the
ECT’s dispute settlement clause.4
The Tribunal’s decision confirmed that Russia was bound
by the terms of the ECT despite the absence of final
ratification because Russia had the opportunity to register its
lack of consent to the provisional application and never did
so; and because the concept of provisional application is not
fundamentally opposed by Russian national laws.5 This
decision affected all investors who made energy-related
investments in Russia prior to its formal withdrawal as a
party to the ECT on Oct. 19, 2009, and these investors will be
afforded the ECT’s protection until Oct. 19, 2029.6 The
Tribunal’s decision fortified prior case law relating to
provisional application and clearly follows customary
international law as codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.7
Part I of this Comment presents the background of the
Energy Charter,8 its provisional application,9 the Yukos
dispute that initiated the arbitration currently pending,10 and
the Tribunal’s decision as it relates to provisional
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application.11 Part II identifies the problems of provisional
application of the Energy Charter Treaty either in part or in
whole.12 Part III analyzes the Tribunal’s decision,13 and Part
IV proposes a solution to the problem of provisional
application: that treaty drafters include much more specific
delineations of pre-entry into force obligations for signatory
countries.14
I.

BACKGROUND

A. A Summary of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

See infra Part I.D.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
Gerhard Hafner, The Energy Charter Treaty, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 593, 599 ( 2009).
16. Energy Charter Treaty art. 2, Dec. 17, 1991, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100, 34
I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ECT]. The European Energy Charter is a non-binding
declaration by over fifty European states to promote energy sector cooperation
after the fall of the USSR. See also Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy
Charter Treaty: A Reader’s Guide (2002), available at http://www.encharter.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/ECT_Guide_ENG.pdf (last visited Oct. 17,
2011).
17. Parish and Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 191.
18. Hafner, supra note 15, at 599.
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The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a “multilateral
treaty that provides a multilateral framework for energy
cooperation ensuring the liberalization of the energy market
including western and eastern, formerly communist
[s]tates.”15 By establishing a legal framework that promotes
long-term cooperation in the energy sector in accordance with
the objectives and principles of the European Energy
Charter,16 it promotes foreign direct investment in the energy
market by affording to investors and investments the
protections of international law.17
The ECT promotes five primary objectives: (1) protection
and encouragement of foreign energy investments based on
the extension of national treatment of most-favored nation
provisions, (2) free trade in energy-related goods based on
World Trade Organization guidelines, (3) freedom of energy
transmission, (4) energy efficiency and heightened
environmental protection, and (5) a mechanism for the
resolution of investment disputes.18 Despite its range of
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goals, experts consider the ECT’s provisions protecting
foreign investment to be the cornerstone of the treaty.19
These provisions divide investment protection into two
categories: pre-investment, where investments are afforded a
“ ‘ soft’ regime of ‘best endeavor obligations,’ ” and postinvestment, where there is a “ ‘ hard’ regime . . . with binding
obligations for the contracting states similar to the
investment protection provisions of the North American Free
Trade Agreement . . . .”20
Parties seeking cooperation on energy between Eastern
and Western Europe produced the ECT in order to reconcile
two inconvenient realities: Eastern Europe was energy-rich
but cash poor and therefore in need of foreign investment to
extract, market, and transport its products, while Western
Europe needed to diversify its energy sources and possessed
the capital to do so.21 But because Eastern Europe was still
restructuring its economies after the fall of the Soviet Union,
backers of the ECT considered “quick economic integration of
energy markets in the former East and West . . . vital to the
restructuring and reform of the former communist economies
. . . .”22 Therefore, the ECT contains a clause authorizing its
“provisional application.”23 Provisional application of a treaty
occurs when its obligations are imposed on a signatory state
prior to full ratification by the state government.24
B. Provisional Application and the ECT

04/16/2012 17:10:32

19. Kaj Hober, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, 1 J.
INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 153, 155 (2010).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 154.
22. Ulrich Klaus, The Gate to Arbitration – The Yukos Case the Provisional
Application of the Energy Charter Treaty in the Russian Federation, 2
TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTE
MANAGEMENT
(2005),
available
at
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=498
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2010).
23. See ECT, supra note 16, art. 45.
24. Hafner, supra note 15, at 594.
25. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 357.
26. Id.
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Conclusion of a treaty has three parts: signature,
ratification, and entry into force.25 The act of signing a treaty
does not create a legal duty on the signatory to ratify the
treaty, nor does it—without something more—create a duty
to abide by the provisions of the treaty.26 As a general
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principle of international law, treaties also do not have legal
effect before their entry into force.27 Provisional application is
meant to resolve the difficulties that arise as a result of what
is oftentimes a significant delay between when a treaty is
signed and when it is ratified by member nations and entered
into force.28 Though failure to ratify a treaty would normally
preclude even the discussion of whether a state was bound by
the obligations of the treaty, the theory of provisional
application is a work-around solution that mandates
compliance with treaty terms pre-ratification.29
Provisional application is a relatively common practice
for treaties demanding immediate enforcement, such as those
to provide disaster relief or war support, though it has only
recently seen use in investment treaties.30 The Vienna
Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) first
explicitly addressed the idea of provisional application.31 In
Article 25 (Provisional Application), the VCLT provided a
broad background for provisional application, affording treaty
parties much discretion in its use:
1. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally
pending its entry into force if:
(a) the treaty itself so provides; or
(b) the negotiation States have in some other
manner so agreed.
2.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

27. Id.
28. Matthew Belz, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty:
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia and Improving Provisional Application in
Multilateral Treaties, 22 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 727, 728–29 (2008).
29. William Spiegelberger, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in
Russia: An Analysis of the Relevant Treaties, Laws, and Cases, 16 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 261, 271 n.48 (2005).
30. Belz, supra note 28, at 728. The author notes that “[n]egotiating states
typically provide for such application when matters must be urgently dealt with
or the parties are faced with or act in anticipation of an international crisis and
need to bypass the time-consuming practice of concluding treaties.” Id. at 728
n.7.
31. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 355 n.3
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Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the
negotiating States have otherwise agreed, the
provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty
with respect to a State shall be terminated if that
State notifies the other States between which the
treaty is being applied provisionally of its intention

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 191 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

7_LAIDLAW FINAL.DOC FINAL

660

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

3/15/2012 9:05:58 PM

[Vol. 52

not to become a party to the treaty.32

04/16/2012 17:10:32

32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter VCLT]. art. 25,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (1969).
33. Hafner, supra note 15, at 594.
34. Hober, supra note 19, at 164.
35. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 358.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Hober, supra note 19, at 164.
39. Hafner, supra note 15, at 594.
40. Id. at 595.
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The VCLT refers only to the methods for making the treaty
applicable and for terminating this application rather than
delineating the scope of provisional application; “it neither
implies any restriction of the scope of the treaty nor does it
define the method through which the provisional application
is launched except that it differs from that required for the
entry into force.”33
Controversially, provisional application of a treaty
creates a dilemma where treaty obligations are given effect
prior to a country’s formal ratification or accession to the
treaty.34 Provisional application of a treaty is generally
utilized in one of two situations.35 The first scenario involves
a treaty created in response to some form of international
crisis, where “immediate and decisive action may be
necessary to avert catastrophe.” In this case, ratification
delays are not acceptable and provisional application works
as a way around the delay.36
The second scenario involves a treaty where quick, broad
participation and enforcement is necessary in order for it to
be effective.37 In this case, pre-ratification application is
justified by the fact that some states may want to undertake
their responsibilities immediately, that those participating in
the negotiations are certain the treaty will eventually be
ratified, or that the negotiators are attempting to work
around other political hurdles.38
Despite the specifications in the VCLT, provisional
application remains an amorphous and vague doctrine often
characterized by ambiguity.39 This ambiguity arises from the
key consideration of whether provisional application applies
to the treaty as a whole or is limited to certain provisions in a
more piece-meal approach.40 Though relatively undefined,
provisional application “can be best understood as an attempt

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 192 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

7_LAIDLAW FINAL.DOC FINAL

2012]

3/15/2012 9:05:58 PM

ECT AND THE YUKOS DISPUTE

661

to solve the collective action problem created by the gap
between signature and entry into force of an international
treaty.”41 Provisional application solves the problem of a
country capturing treaty benefits at the time of signing
without incurring the obligations that accompany
ratification.42 By forcing signatory parties to face the costs
and ramifications of treaty obligations immediately upon
signature, provisional application is an incentive for a
country to ratify the treaty in full without delay.43
As in most treaties that utilize provisional application,
the ECT expands on the language of the VCLT with an entire
article discussing the scope of its provisional application.44
However, the ECT still does not address the scope of the
provisional application, beyond allowing states an opt-out
clause if the treaty is in conflict with national law.45 Article
45 of the ECT, the section containing the guidelines for
provisional application, begins by providing that:
(1) Each signatory agrees to apply this Treaty
provisionally pending its entry into force for such
signatory in accordance with Article 44, to the extent that
such provisional application is not inconsistent with its
constitution, laws or regulations.46

[Plain meaning] can result in a partial provisional
application of the ECT, namely to the extent the
provisions of the ECT are not inconsistent with the
signatory’s constitution, laws, or regulations. This ipso
Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 355.
Id. at 359.
Id.
Hafner, supra note 15, at 597.
Id.
ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(1).
Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 360.
VCLT, supra note 32, art. 31.
Hafner, supra note 15, at 601.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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In brief, Article 45(1) applies the treaty provisionally so
long as application is not inconsistent with the laws,
constitution, or regulations of the country; however, much
uncertainty lies within this section of the ECT.47 Pursuant to
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of
Treaties,48 the first step in determining the meaning of an
article is to look at its ordinary meaning. Under this method,
the language “to the extent” operates ipso jure:49
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jure effect is also confirmed by practice: the United
Kingdom recognized that, due to the ‘to the extent clause’
of Article 45(1) ECT, the Russian Federation was obliged
to apply the ECT provisionally only to the extent that such
provisional application was not inconsistent with its
constitution, laws, or regulations.50

04/16/2012 17:10:32

50. Id.
51. Klaus, supra note 22.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Hafner, supra note 15, at 601.
55. Klaus, supra note 22.
56. Id.
57. See Noah Rubins and Azizjon Nazarov, Investment Treaties and the
Russian Federation: Baiting the Bear?, 9 BUS. L. INT’L 100, 111 (2008).
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Two interpretations of the language of 45(1) have
evolved.51 One approach applies the ECT provisionally only if
the national laws of the signatory state allow provisional
application of international treaties and these national laws
have been followed.52 In this case, only the legal concept of
provisional application must be compatible with national law,
rather than every term of the ECT.53 So long as national laws
are compatible with provisional application of the terms of
the treaty, no further inquiry is necessary to determine
whether the treaty’s other articles are in agreement with
national laws.54
That is not the case with the second approach to the
interpretation of Article 45(1), which requires not only that
national laws of the signatory state allow the provisional
application of the treaty, but that the treaty’s terms comport
with national laws before the treaty can be provisionally
applied.55 According to one scholar, this second approach
seems more likely correct because the purpose “of a limitation
in provisional application, as in Article 45(1) of the ECT, is to
avoid possible internal conflicts between the treaty’s
provisions and national regulations during a transitional
period.”56
The controversy stemming from Article 45(1)’s
provisional application of treaty terms is whether it deems
parliamentary ratification useless; if a signatory state must
comply with a treaty’s terms after signing, why go through
the lengthy and formal process of ratification?57 The tribunal
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in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan58 gave minor consideration to this
issue,59 holding that “Article 45(1) of the ECT meant that the
signature document . . . was already sufficient for the treaty
to enter into effect . . . and that this accession remained in
force indefinitely.”60
Article 45(2) allows a signatory to opt out of provisional
application by notifying other signatory countries.61 By
exercising this right, a country and its investors may not
claim the benefits of provisional application:62
2(a) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) any signatory may,
when signing, deliver to the Depositary a declaration that
it is not able to accept provisional application. The
obligation contained in paragraph (1) shall not apply to a
signatory making such a declaration. Any such signatory
may at any time withdraw that declaration by written
notification to the Depository.
(b) Neither a signatory which makes a declaration in
accordance with subparagraph (a) nor Investors of that
signatory may claim the benefits of provisional application
under paragraph (1).
(c) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a), any signatory
making a declaration referred to in subparagraph (a) shall
apply Part VII provisionally pending the entry into force
of the Treaty for such signatory in accordance with Article
44, to the extent that such provisional application is not
inconsistent with its laws or regulations.63

04/16/2012 17:10:32

58. Petrobart Ltd. v. The Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitral Award of the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, SCC Case No.
126/2003 (March 29, 2005) [hereinafter Petrobart Award]. A tribunal is a court
with special jurisdiction generally based on multilateral agreements and with
the purpose of hearing claims often relating to international issues. See, e.g.,
Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and
Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U J. INT’L L. & POL. 679 (1999).
59. Rubins and Nazarov, supra note 57, at 111 (“The claimant in the case
was a company created under the laws of Gibraltar, which initiated . . .
arbitration against Kyrgyzstan under the ECT in relation to gas supplies in
Central Asia.”).
60. Id.; see also Petrobart Award, supra note 58.
61. ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(2).
62. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 360.
63. ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(2).
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This approach differs strongly from that of 45(1) because
“[p]ursuant to this provision, any signatory State may declare
that it does not accept the provisional application of the ECT.
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The expression ‘may’ expresses a right or option that can be
exercised, but does not impose any obligation on the State.”64
Whereas Article 45(1) passively obliges the nation upon
signing, without necessitating further action, a nation must
actively exercise Article 45(2) before it takes effect.65 Article
45(2) was designed specifically to allow a signatory nation
explicitly to reject provisional application and thereby excuse
itself from the obligation incurred in Article 45(1).66 Though
several signatory states utilized this opt-out provision, the
Russian Federation was not one of them.67 By July 2006, only
five countries—Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Norway, and the
Russian Federation—had yet to ratify the ECT, and of those
five, Australia, Iceland, and Norway all exercised the opt-out
provision in Article 45(2).68 Clearly, Articles 45(1) and
45(2) represent two different approaches to provisional
application.69
Even if a nation accepts provisional application of the
treaty, Article 45(3) gives that signatory the right to
terminate provisional application at any time. However,
despite terminating application of the treaty, the signatory
must continue to abide by the provisions of the ECT relating
to investment promotion and protection and dispute
settlement for the twenty years following termination.70 The
text of 45(3) reads:

(b) In the event that a signatory terminates provisional
application under subparagraph (a), the obligation of the

04/16/2012 17:10:32

64. Hafner, supra note 15, at 601.
65. ECT, supra note 16, arts. 45(1), 45(2).
66. Hafner, supra note 15, at 602.
67. Frederik Erixon, European Center for International Political Economy
Policy Brief 7 1, 10 (2008), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.172.1403&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
68. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 360.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(3).

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 193 Side B

(3)(a) Any signatory may terminate its provisional
application of this Treaty by written notification to the
Depositary of its intention not to become a Contracting
Party to the Treaty.
Termination of provisional
application for any signatory shall take effect upon the
expiration of 60 days from the date on which such
signatory’s written notification is received by the
Depositary.
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signatory under paragraph (1) to apply Parts III and V
with respect to any Investments made in its Area during
such provisional application by Investors of other
signatories shall nevertheless remain in effect with
respect to those Investments for twenty years following
the effective date of termination, except as otherwise
provided in subparagraph (c).71

ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(3).
Erixon, supra note 67, at 12.
ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(3)(b).
Erixon, supra note 67, at 12.
Id. This is the main focus of the Yukos Tribunal. See infra Part III.
Hober, supra note 19, at 166.
Id.
Id.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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Provisional application ends under Article 45(3)(a) when the
signatory state submits written notification of its desire not to
become a party to the treaty.72 Until then, Article 45(3)(b)
bestows a range of benefits to investors and investments.73
Despite a signatory’s notification that it intends to terminate
its application of the ECT, the terminating signatory must
still apply Part III (Promotion and Protection of Investment)
and Part V (Dispute Settlement) of the ECT to investments
made prior to termination for twenty years following the date
of termination.74 This provision implies that the treaty as a
whole applies provisionally for an indefinite period of time
unless terminated by the signatory, in which case certain
provisions relating to protection of prior investments remain
in effect for twenty years.75
The inclusion of Article 45 in the ECT triggered
provisional application of its rules by all signatory parties in
December 1994 until the ECT’s entry into force in April 1998,
unless a signatory state explicitly rejected provisional
application.76 After the treaty’s entry into force in April 1998,
it still required provisional application to signatory states
that had not yet ratified it.77 Russia was one of these states.
Having initiated the ratification process in 1996 with the
ECT’s introduction to the State Duma and Parliamentary
hearings in 1998, the Duma continually postponed
ratification due to concerns about certain provisions of the
treaty.78
Because it initially signed the ECT, “Russia and the
other signatories . . . agreed to apply [the ECT] provisionally
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pending its entry into force . . . to the extent that such
provisional application [was] not inconsistent with its
constitution, laws or regulations.”79 Russia did not enter a
declaration of non-application under ECT Article 45(2),
therefore the treaty required Russia to accept its application
on a provisional basis.80
C.

The Yukos Dispute

04/16/2012 17:10:32

79. Spiegelberger, supra note 29, at 271 n.48 (internal citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Belz, supra note 28, at 727.
82. Id.
83. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 362.
84. Id. at 363. See also Waltrip, supra note 1, at 581 (noting that
Khodorkovsky initially loaned the Russian government over $300 million and
then acquired control when the Russian government defaulted on the loan).
85. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 363.
86. Brenden Marino Carbonell, Comment, Cornering the Kremlin:
Defending Yukos and TNK-BP from Strategic Expropriation by the Russian
State, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 257, 261 (2009).
87. Id.
88. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 363.
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The Yukos Arbitration, the largest arbitration in history
based on amount of money in controversy and a case at least
initially centering on the issue of provisional application of
the ECT,81 has its roots in the organization of the Yukos Oil
Company in 1993 under the laws of the Russian Federation.82
Yukos was a joint stock corporation that had been publiclytraded since the privatization of state-owned energy
The Russian
companies after the fall of the USSR.83
Federation, initially the sole shareholder in Yukos, sold its
holdings in 1995 and 1996 to stave off a debt crisis.84 A group
of investors headed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon
Lebedev, Russian citizens, purchased approximately fifty-one
percent of the stock through a Gibraltar-based holding
company called Menatep.85 The privatization of Yukos was
just one part of a massive effort towards de-nationalization
led by Boris Yeltsin in the hope of creating a more Westernstyle, free-market economy.86 Privatization resulted in the
rise of oligarchs like Khodorkovsky, who led Yukos to the
position of top oil producer in Russia.87 For ten years, leaders
of the highly-profitable Yukos wielded significant economic
and political power88 due to Yukos’ quick growth into
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89. Matteo Winkler, Arbitration Without Privity and Russian Oil: The
Yukos Case Before the Houston Court, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 115, 115
(2006).
90. Waltrip, supra note 1, at 582.
91. Winkler, supra note 89, at 116.
92. Elliot Glusker, Arbitration Hurdles Facing Foreign Investors in Russia:
Analysis of Present Issues and Implications, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 595, 611
(2010).
93. Phillip Hanson, Observations on the Costs of the Yukos Affair to Russia,
46 EURASIAN GEOG. & ECON. 481, 483 (2005) (cited in Carbonell, supra note 86,
at 259).
94. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 263.
95. Id. at 280.
96. Catherine Belton, The Arrest that Proved a Turning Point, Moscow
Times 1 (Oct. 25, 2006) (cited in Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 363).
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a multinational corporation.89 Yukos’ highest levels of
production made it one of the world’s largest private oil
companies in terms of reserves and market capitalization.90
In 2003, it boasted over 600 subsidiaries, an average daily
output of more than 1.6 million barrels of oil, $2 billion in
distributed dividends, and $18 billion in assets.91 Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, Yukos’ chairman, was considered Russia’s
richest man.92
After Vladimir Putin became president of Russia in 1999,
he made his feelings toward the private powerful energy
companies clear; these feelings were expressed by his deputy
head of the Presidential Administration, Vladislav Surkov,
who commented that “[the new administration] will not allow
a small group of companies to be the power in the country
where they permeate the state apparatus.”93 President Putin
viewed energy resources as “an opportunity for Russia to
recover economically and re-emerge on the geopolitical stage
as a superpower. The oil and natural gas should further the
revitalization of the entire country.”94
The Putin administration exerted great control over
Russia’s energy sector, enforcing a stiff period of regulation
that marked a “stark contrast to the free-wheeling laissezfaire attitude characteristic of the Yeltsin years.”95 Beginning
in 2003, Putin’s administration sought to achieve this goal of
returning major energy sector companies to state control
by harassing those involved with Yukos.96 In July, the
government arrested Lebedev, the president of Menatep, on
charges of illegally acquiring an investment in a stateowned fertilizer company. “Over the next month, Russian
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97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Glusker, supra note 92, at 611.
101. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 363.
102. Waltrip, supra note 1, at 582–83.
103. Winkler, supra note 89, at 117.
104. Id.
105. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 267.
106. Dmitry Golobolov and Joseph Tanega, Yukos Risk, the Double-Edged
Sword: A Case Note on International Bankruptcy Litigation and the
Transnational Limits of Corporate Governance, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 557, 582
(2006).
107. Yukos Oil Co. v. Russian Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130,
138 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004); see also Golobolov and Tanega, supra note 106, at
596 (“Judge Clark entered a TRO enjoining certain entities from taking any
actions with respect to YNG stock, including participating in the auction.”).
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authorities continued to arrest a number of former and
current employees of Menatep, Yukos, and subsidiaries.”97 In
October, authorities arrested Khodorkovsky for fraud and tax
evasion, charges that were widely believed to stem from
Khodorkovsky’s support of Putin’s political rivals, and from
the possibility that Exxon Mobil had interest in buying a
holding in Yukos from Menatep.98
The Russian government also confronted Yukos about tax
deficiencies99 that were seen as largely politically
motivated.100 The Russian Ministry of Finance in December
2003 made a series of tax assessments that would eventually
total $27.5 billion, based on purportedly deficient tax
payments from 2000 to 2004.101 Authorities froze over five
billion dollars of assets held by several principal Yukos
investors,102 and in November 2004, the bailiffs of the
Ministry of Justice announced an auction of Yukos’ primary
production arm, Yuganskneftegaz (YNG), responsible for over
sixty percent of Yukos’ oil production.103 The Ministry of
Justice announced that it was only seeking half of the actual
market price for YNG.104
In order to halt the YNG auction, the managers of Yukos
filed a bankruptcy action in Houston, Texas.105 United States
bankruptcy laws, among the most debtor-favorable in the
world, gave jurisdiction to companies with worldwide assets
and could prevent creditors from appropriating those
assets.106 Though the judge initially granted an injunction
forbidding various corporate entities and “those persons in
active concert or participation with them”107 from
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participating in the sale, the auction nevertheless continued
as planned, with a previously unknown company called
Baikalfinansgroup winning the auction and subsequently
merging with Rosneft, the Russian state-owned energy
Baikalfinansgroup, thought to be a front
company.108
company and only recently registered in a grocery shop in a
small Russian town, paid $9.4 billion for an asset that was
valued at $60 billion by the London Stock Exchange,109 and
between $14.7 billion and $21.1 billion by private
financiers.110
Because it appeared that the entire auction was a blatant
attempt by the Russian government to regain control over
Yukos, there was much international criticism of the sale.111
Fueling this criticism is the fact that after acquisition by
Rosneft, the tax claims against YNG were reduced by nearly
$4 billion;112 “these events strengthen the perception that the
actions against Yukos were not an issue of legitimate tax
liability, but rather part of a plan by the Russian government
to consolidate control over the energy sector.”113
Yukos continued to seek protection under the bankruptcy
laws of the United States,114 but the court in Texas eventually
granted Russia’s motion to dismiss the case based on the
totality of the circumstances, including Yukos’ inability to
reorganize without the cooperation of the Russian
government; the fact that it had only recently begun to hold
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 196 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

Those entities included the three Russian companies registered to bid at the
auction and the six banks that had announced interest in funding a purchaser’s
bid. Id.
108. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 267; see also Erin E. Arvedlund and Steven
Lee Meyers, An All-but-Unknown Company Wins a Rich Russian Oil Stake, NY
TIMES A1 (Dec. 20, 2004) (“The mystery surrounding the winner -- a company
called the Baikal Finans Group that is registered in Tver, a medium-size city
170 miles northwest of Moscow -- immediately raised suspicion among industry
analysts” and an analyst commented after the auction ended that “the surprise
winning bidder, Baikal Finans Group, is either a front for Gazprom or a statefriendly company . . . [or] a combination of state and state-friendly interests.”).
109. The Economist, “After Yukos: The Far-Reaching Legacy of the Yukos
Affair,” May 10, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/node/9167397.
110. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 365.
111. Golobolov and Tanega, supra note 106, at 603–04 (noting that the sale
was “mysterious” and undermined confidence in investing in Russia).
112. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 365.
113. Id.
114. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 267. See also Winkler, supra note 89, at
119–21.
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115. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 267. See also Winkler, supra note 89, at
119–21.
116. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 365; see also ECT, supra note 16, art. 26(3).
117. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 365–66.
118. Id. at 366; see also International Institute for Sustainable Development,
Investment Treaty News 4 (Feb. 22, 2005) available at http://www.iisd.org/
pdf/2005/investment_investsd_feb22_2005.pdf.
119. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 366.
120. Id.
121. Alison Ross, Lawyers React to Yukos Awards, 5 GLOBAL ARBITRATION
REV. 11, 11 (2010).
122. Id.
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assets in the United States and initiated proceedings in
multiple fora; the complexity of applying numerous foreign
statutes involved in such a complex situation; lack of personal
jurisdiction over most foreign officials involved; and the
necessity of cooperation by the Russian government to
successfully adjudicate the matter, which did not seem
forthcoming.115
Seeking to find remuneration for an asset assertedly
expropriated by the Russian government, Menatep’s major
subsidiaries sent notice to Russia on November 2, 2004 that
triggered the ECT’s mandatory three-month conciliation
period.116 Once the conciliation period ended, the subsidiaries
filed a notice of arbitration with Russia, filing a $28.3 billion
claim for compensation due as a consequence for the actions
The arbitration
taken by the Russian government.117
proceeded under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and was
supervised by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The
Hague.118 Menatep’s primary claim was that Russia’s actions
against Yukos, especially the forced sale of YNG, were
tantamount to expropriation.119 The threshold issue for the
panel of arbitrators to decide was whether Russia was
required to abide by the provisions of the ECT as a whole.120
The issue was the subject of two rounds of written pleadings
and a hearing in The Hague in 2008, and the tribunal came to
a decision near the end of 2009.121 Because only a brief
summary of the decision was initially released, there was
much speculation about the substance of the award, the first
ECT award against Russia.122
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D. The Tribunal’s Decision on Provisional Application
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123. Id.
124. See, e.g., id.
125. Dr. Chiara Giorgetti, The Yukos Interim Awards on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility Confirms Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty, 14
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHT ISSUE 23 (Aug. 3, 2010).
126. Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation, Interim Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 227 (Nov. 30, 2009), available
at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/YULvRussianFederation-InterimAward30Nov2009.pdf; Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation, Interim Award
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 226 (Nov. 30, 2009),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/HELvRussianFederation-Interim
Award-30Nov2009.pdf; Veteran Petroleum Trust v. Russian Federation, Interim
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 228 (Nov. 30, 2009),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/VPLvRussianFederation-Interim
Award-30Nov2009.pdf [hereinafter VPT Award]. The Tribunal is hearing these
three cases together and issued an identical decision for each case. Id.; see also
Giorgetti, supra note 125.
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On February 1, 2010, counsel for claimant Menatep
unilaterally published the entire arbitral decision despite
Russia’s reluctance toward making the award public.123
Though the tribunal addressed multiple preliminary issues in
the arbitration,124 only its decision regarding provisional
application of the ECT will be addressed in this Comment.
With regard to whether Article 45 of the ECT required
that Russia provisionally apply the terms of the treaty to the
claimants’ investments, the Tribunal used a three-step
analysis to hold that Russia must protect the investments as
it would have under the ECT.125 As a preliminary matter, the
Tribunal noted that the parties agreed to certain facts: first,
that Russia signed the ECT on December 17, 1994 and that it
was discussed in parliament but never ratified; second, that
Russia notified the ECT countries of its intention not to
become a party on August 20, 2009, effectively terminating its
provisional application on October 18, 2009; and third, that
Russia was still bound by ECT 45(3)(b) to give provisional
application of Parts III and V—the sections relating to
protection of previous investments—until October 18, 2029 of
the ECT to any investments made in Russia before the date of
termination of provisional application.126
The Tribunal began its analysis by considering whether
Russia was obligated to prepare a declaration under Article
45(2) of the ECT in order to make use of Article 45(1), the
clause of the ECT that proscribes provisional application
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127. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 244; see also Giorgetti, supra note
125.
128. ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(2).
129. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 264.
130. Id. at para. 251.
131. Id. at para. 250.
132. Id.
133. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.”).
134. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 262.
135. Id. at para. 263.
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when it is inconsistent with the constitution, laws, or
regulations of the signatory state (known as the Limitation
Clause).127 Article 45(2) states that a signatory may, at the
time of signing, notify other signatory parties that it is not
able to accept provisional application.128 The Tribunal agreed
with Russia that this language did not preclude a state from
arguing that its laws were against provisional application
when the state had not submitted a declaration under
45(2).129
The Claimants argued that, pursuant to the plain
meaning of the ECT, Article 45(1) established the principle of
provisional application and 45(2) established the “procedure
according to which a signatory State may opt out of the
concept of provisional application.”130 The Tribunal, however,
declined to follow this suggestion and instead found that
Articles 45(1) and 45(2) presented two separate regimes of
provisional application.131 Article 45(1) applied “only in case
of inconsistency between the treaty provisions and a
signatory’s constitution, laws, or regulations,” and did not
require a declaration. Section 45(2), on the other hand,
applied when a state wanted to prevent provisional
application for political or other reasons, and did require an
express declaration.132
The Tribunal made this determination first by using
Article 31 of the VCLT133 to examine the plain meaning of
Article 45.134 Though both the Claimant and Respondent
made arguments based on the plain meaning of the law, the
Tribunal found that respondent Russia’s approach was more
faithful to the object and purpose of the ECT.135 In addition,
six signatory states had already relied on the Limitation
Clause in Article 45(1) without delivering a formal notice to
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the ECT governing body as required by Article 45(2).136
Beyond this evidence of state practice, the Tribunal also
found support in the recent ICSID arbitration decision in the
Kardassopoulos case.137 There, the Tribunal noted:
There is no necessary link between paragraphs (1) and (2)
of Article 45. A declaration made under paragraph (2)
may be, but does not have to be, motivated by an
inconsistency between provisional application and
something in the State’s domestic law; there may be other
reasons which prompt a State to make such a declaration.
Equally, a State whose situation is characterized by such
inconsistency is entitled to rely on the proviso to
paragraph (1) without the need to make, in addition,
declaration under paragraph (2).
The Tribunal is
therefore unable to read into the failure of either State to
make a declaration of the kind referred to in Article 45(2)
any implication that it therefore acknowledges that there
is no inconsistency between provisional application and its
domestic law.138

04/16/2012 17:10:32

136. Id. at para. 265. The six countries were Austria, Luxembourg, Italy,
Romania, Portugal, and Turkey. Id.
137. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 228 (July 6, 2007) (quoted in VPT Award, supra note 126, para
269.).
138. Id.
139. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 270.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at para. 274. These countries include Luxembourg, Finland,
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Once it had determined that the approaches dictated by
Articles 45(1) and 45(2) were independent of one another,139
the Tribunal addressed its next issue regarding provisional
application: whether Article 45(1), the Limitation Clause,
required states to inform the other signatories that it could
not apply the ECT provisionally.140 Both Claimant and
Respondent agreed that Respondent Russia had not made
such a declaration or given prior notice, so “an affirmative
answer to this question would dispose of the Article 45 issue
in favor of Claimant.”141
To support its case, Russia pointed to other countries
that previously relied on the Limitation Clause of Article
45(1) due to a disagreement between national laws and the
obligations of provisional application without making a
formal declaration.142 In response, Claimant argued that
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Germany, and France. Id.
143. Id. at para. 275.
144. Id. at para. 281.
145. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 284.
146. Id. at para 283.
147. Id. at para. 286–88. The Tribunal found that “conditions for the
existence of a situation of estoppels are not met in this case, because . . .
Claimant, to succeed with its estoppels argument, would need to establish more
than mere support by the Russian Federation during negotiations of the Treaty
for the provisional application of the ECT.” Id. at para. 286.
148. Id. at para. 290.
149. Id. at para. 289.
150. Id. at para. 290.
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fundamental principles of international law, transparency
and reciprocity, necessitated the provision of formal notices of
legal obstacles to provisional application.143 Additionally,
Claimant argued that not only had the Russian Federation
given no notice of inconsistency under Article 45(1), but it had
also been a firm supporter of the language creating
provisional application of the ECT during ECT
negotiations.144
The Tribunal decided that Russia could—despite “years
of stalwart and unqualified support for provisional
application”—invoke the Limitation Clause to claim
inconsistency between provisional application of the ECT and
national laws in order to avoid provisional application of the
investment protection measures of the ECT.145 It based this
decision on the rules of treaty interpretation found in Articles
31 and 32 of the VCLT that prevent the creation of “a
notification requirement which the text does not disclose and
which no recognized legal principle dictates.”146 The Tribunal
determined that, although the Russian Federation was
subject to considerations of estoppel based on its initial
support for provisional application, the conditions necessary
for such a finding were not met in this case.147
After concluding that Russia could rely on the Limitation
Clause of 45(1) despite neither making a declaration under
45(2) nor giving prior notice under 45(1),148 the Tribunal
decided what effect should be given to the Limitation Clause
of ECT 45(1).149 The Tribunal divided this analysis into two
steps:150 first, whether Russia was required to provisionally
apply the ECT in its entirety or whether it could be allowed to
take a piecemeal approach, and second, whether the general
principle of provisional application was inconsistent with
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VPT Award, supra note 126, paras. 290, 330, 346.
Id. at para. 301 (internal citations omitted).
Giorgetti, supra note 125.
Id.
VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 314.
Id. at para. 315.
Id. at para. 330.
Id. at para. 332 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at para. 337.
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151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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Russian law.151
Deciding the former question, the Tribunal decided that
Russia must accept an “all-or-nothing” approach to
provisional application. After all, “by signing the ECT, the
Russian Federation agreed that the Treaty as a whole would
be applied provisionally pending its entry into force unless the
principle of provisional application itself [was] inconsistent
with its constitution, laws, or regulations.”152 This decision is
considered “especially important . . . [for reinforcing] the
binding nature of international law.”153 Under the principle
of pacta sunt servanda, a State would normally be prevented
from using its national legislation as an excuse for a failure to
perform.154
The Tribunal concluded that “allowing a State to
modulate (or, as the case may be, eliminate) the obligation of
provisional application, depending on the content of its
internal law in relation to the specific provisions found in the
[ECT], would undermine the principle that provisional
application of a treaty creates binding obligations.”155 This
rationale reinforces the integrity of international law as
separate from domestic law by preventing the formation of a
hybrid law “in which the content of domestic law directly
controls the content of an international legal obligation.”156
Having decided that provisional application would, if
applied at all, be applied in its entirety, the Tribunal turned
its focus to whether the principle of provisional application
conflicted with Russian law.157 Claimants argued that the
relevant Russian law allows “an international treaty or a part
thereof . . . prior to its entry into force, [to] be applied in
the Russian Federation provisionally if the treaty so provides
. . . .”158 Further, at the time of the arbitration, Russia was
subject to the provisional application of forty-five other
treaties.159
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In summary, the Tribunal’s decision regarding
provisional application of the ECT began by determining that
the “regimes of provisional application in Article 45(1) and
45(2) are separate, and the Russian Federation can benefit
from the Limitation Clause in Article 45(1) even though it
made no declaration under 45(2).”160 Next, the Tribunal
found that Russia could invoke the Limitation Clause despite
neither making a prior declaration nor giving any prior notice
to other signatory states that it intended to use Article 45(1)
to prevent provisional application.161 The Tribunal then
noted that the Limitation Clause in 45(1) negated provisional
application of the ECT only if the principle of general
provisional application of the entire treaty conflicted with the
constitution, laws, or regulations of the signatory.162 Finally,
the Tribunal determined that no such conflict existed
between the laws of the Russian Federation and the principle
of provisional application of treaties.163 Based on these
conclusions, the Tribunal determined that the Russian
Federation was subject to provisional application of the entire
ECT until October 19, 2009, and of Parts III and V until
October 19, 2029 for any investments made prior to the date
of termination of provisional application.164 The Tribunal
asserted this decision as the basis for its jurisdiction over the
arbitration, and finally concluded that Russia would be
precluded from making arguments based on the
inapplicability of certain ECT provisions.165

The Yukos Tribunal confronted the issue of whether the
ECT should be provisionally applied when a signatory
country had made no previous declaration that provisional
application was at odds with the laws of the country.166 The
Tribunal decided that non-declaration did not automatically
mandate provisional application, but also found that Russia’s
national laws were not opposed to provisional application and
Id. at para. 394.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 395.
Id. at para. 397–98.
See supra Part I.D.
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
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therefore Russia was obligated to comport with the terms of
the treaty until its withdrawal as a signatory state.167 The
Tribunal’s decision holding Russia to the terms of a treaty
that it never fully approved raises the issue of whether
provisional application is appropriate with regards to the
Energy Charter Treaty and international treaty law
generally, and Russia’s treatment of foreign investors
specifically. Provisional application of a treaty that has not
yet been fully ratified is a controversial legal maneuver
because it enforces treaty obligations prior to final state
approval.168 Because of its relative infancy in the world of
customary international law, the scope and duration of
provisional application, as well as the validity of the theory as
a whole, needs further clarification.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE TRIBUNAL’S PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
DECISION

04/16/2012 17:10:32

167. Id.
168. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 370.
169. Id. at 371–72 (noting that “the Statute of the International Court of
Justice does not expressly enumerate private arbitral decisions as a recognized
source of international law). Furthermore, Article 32(2) of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules expressly denies an award precedential value by only
providing that an award is “binding on the parties.” Id.
170. Id. at 372. See also AES Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/17, Award on Jurisdiction (2005) (cited in Markus Esley, “The Curious
Case of the 15 Professors - Claims Against Russia Under the Energy Charter
Treaty,” The Arbiter: International Disputes Newswire (April 2010), available at
http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/00012511-8e60-469a-ae3d-f2a42b6
f429f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0dcd6d93-ba64-45e7-a224-f91bb3654
518/CP_ArbiterNews-0410.pdf (noting that “tribunals do, undoubtedly, read
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The Tribunal’s decision that the ECT should be applied
as a whole to investments made in Russia prior to Russia’s
withdrawal as an ECT signatory sets an important, though
non-binding, precedent on the treatment of treaties yet to be
fully ratified that contain provisional application clauses.169
Though there is no mandatory accord with the precedent of
past tribunals, arbitral awards often represent a summary of
the current legal thinking and state of the law. Therefore,
the “outcome of the Yukos Arbitration has the potential to
directly impact not only future arbitration under the ECT
but, more broadly, the status, characterization, and
obligations imposed by the provisional application in
international law.”170 It has been noted that, “it will take
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prior awards on similar issues and will not disregard them lightly”)).
171. Esley, supra note 170, at 5.
172. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 312–15; see also VCLT, supra note 32,
art. 26 and 27.
173. Giorgetti, supra note 125.
174. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 316.
175. Id. at para. 313.
176. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 228 (July 6, 2007).
177. Hober, supra note 19, at 185. The author notes that if ‘entry into force’
in Article 1(6) of the ECT (the provision regarding the nature of investments)
were construed strictly and “[meant] only definitive entry into force, it would
mean that investments during the period of provisional application would be
excluded from the ECT. Such a result would strike at the heart of the clearly
intended provisional application regime.” Id.
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quite a lot of persuasive argument to get other tribunals . . .
to depart from the decision in the Yukos awards.”171
As noted by the Tribunal itself, the Award reinforces the
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the theory that states must
abide by their agreements, and of the concept that conflict
with national law is not an excuse for failure to abide by the
terms of an international agreement entered into force.172
Though the Tribunal did stretch this definition of pacta sunt
servanda by placing obligations on Russia based on a treaty
not yet entered into force, the Award serves as a notice that
countries should not idly enter into multilateral agreements
By
through which large investments will be made.173
preventing Russia from choosing which parts of the ECT to
apply provisionally, the Tribunal reinforced the idea that
provisional application of a treaty creates legally-binding
obligations.174 If the Tribunal had allowed Russia to escape
the obligations imposed by provisional application, Russia
would receive the benefits of investments made in reliance on
the expectation of the ECT’s protection without having to
afford any such protection to these investments.175
The Tribunal’s decision fortifies that of the tribunal in
Kardassopoulos, where the arbitrators found that the ECT
should be provisionally applicable as a whole;176 they believed
that “provisional application imports the application of all the
treaty’s provisions as if they were already in force, even
though the treaty’s definitive entry into force had not yet
occurred.”177 The counsel for Kardassopoulos commented that
the Yukos decision “underscores the effectiveness of
provisional application as a device for giving international
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178. Ross, supra note 121, at 11 (internal citations omitted).
179. Id.
180. The obligations that the Tribunal places on Russia are naturally limited
to the investment protection provisions of the ECT. See supra Part I.D.
181. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 374.
182. Id. at 375.
183. Id.
184. Alan Riley, The EU-Russia Energy Relationship: Will the Yukos Decision
Trigger a Fundamental Reassessment in Moscow?, 2 INT’L ENERGY L. REV. 36,
37 (2010).
185. See Golobolov and Tanega, supra note 106, at 647.
186. Riley, supra note 184, at 37; see also Franz Sedelmayer v. Russian
Federation, IIC 106 (1998) (allowing an arbitral decision against Russia to be
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treaties immediate and binding effect and confirms that it is
in no way a watered-down application of the treaty or an
aspirational exercise.”178
In addition to enforcing Russia’s compliance with the
provisions of a treaty that it had provisionally ratified, the
Yukos tribunal also decreased the risk of defection by other
countries.179
Because the tribunal portrayed Russia’s
obligations as binding, affirmative, and not limited in
scope,180 there is no incentive for more countries in the
provisional ratification stage to defer from final entry into
force.181 Beyond specifically deterring other countries from
abrogation of their treaty duties, the Yukos decision will also
serve as a foundation for the future discussion of provisional
Because global
application in international law.182
multilateral investment treaties are on the rise, provisional
application could be a key way of achieving investment
protection prior to the lengthy process of full ratification.183
The decision also has strong implications for investors in
the energy sector who can claim the protection of the ECT.
By holding a major energy-producing country like Russia to
the terms of the ECT, the tribunal reinforced the rule of law
and ended Russia’s attempts to portray the ECT as an
ineffective legal instrument in need of replacement; rather,
the ECT has become an effective multilateral agreement to
protect investors in the field of energy.184 Though, as with
most arbitration decisions, there is little possibility of any
monetary collection by the claimants due to the bias of
national court systems tasked with enforcing decisions,185
collection of a possible award seems more likely in this case
given the ECT’s allowance of attachment of extraterritorial
assets to satisfy arbitral decisions.186 The Yukos decision and
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enforced through the attachment of extraterritorial Russian-owned property).
187. Riley, supra note 184, at 37–38.
188. Id. at 38.
189. Id. (noting that internal capital cannot come close to covering the
needed infrastructure investments and that Russia will therefore have to rely
on international funding, a source that it cannot guarantee after the lessons
that investors learned from the Yukos dispute).
190. Id.
191. Ross, supra note 121, at 12.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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its application of the investment protection terms of the ECT
furthers the purpose of the ECT—promoting and insulating
investments in the energy sector.187
Russia’s withdrawal as a signatory of the ECT, and the
Yukos tribunal’s subsequent decision that Russia will be
bound by the investment protection sections of the ECT for
the next twenty years, possibly places on Russia the burden
of affording protection to past investors without the
accompanying influx of new investments.188 This comes at a
particularly bad time for the Russian energy sector as
analysts have predicted nearly half a trillion dollars of
energy-related investments as necessary by 2020 to sustain
Russia’s energy-producing infrastructure.189 In sum, Russia
will have to afford customary international law standards to
investments made in its oil industry without receiving the
benefits derived from an adherence to international norms,
such as heightened investor confidence and lower political
risk.190
Some have criticized the awards for giving the protection
of the ECT to an investment of foreign companies as
customary under the treaty, and notably, an investment of a
company primarily owned by wealthy Russians.191 Following
this decision, Russian nationals making energy investments
in Russia would be protected if they made the investment
through a shell company incorporated in an alternate
jurisdiction, but not if they made the investment directly.192
This may be true, but the same could be said of any
multilateral or bilateral investment protection treaty that
affords
protection
to
foreigners
making
in-state
193
investments.
Notably, applying the provisions of the treaty as a whole
places a large burden on potential claimants; before bringing
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a case to arbitration, a prudent investor needs to ensure the
entire treaty’s consistency with the domestic regulations
regarding provisional application of treaties, as well as the
host nation’s domestic laws in general.194 Confusingly, this
would place the burden of proof on the investor, rather than
the state, to show that the treaty may be applied
provisionally despite the explicit authorization of provisional
The
application found in the text of the ECT.195
Kardassopoulos and subsequent Yukos decisions may
“[reduce] investor confidence in the ECT” due to this switch of
the burden of proof.196 Importantly, though, the provisional
application of the treaty as a whole would reduce the
confidence level of investors less than the application of the
treaty in part.197 Provisional application imposes a large
hurdle for an investor already facing years of complex
arbitration, but it is the nature of complex international
investment law and still in the interest of claimants to
pursue.
IV. PROPOSAL

04/16/2012 17:10:32

194. Piotr Szwedo, Case Comment: (Former) Yukos v. Russian Federation
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 18 J. INT’L COOPERATION STUDIES
57, 62 (2010).
195. Belz, supra note 28, at 745.
196. Id.
197. Szwedo, supra note 194, at 62.
198. See supra Part III.
199. Belz, supra note 28, at 755.
200. See, e.g., id.
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As noted in Part III, the Yukos Tribunal’s decision
follows the existing case law and treaty law relating to
The issue of provisional
provisional application.198
application arises because of a lack of precision in the
drafting of treaty language, sometimes purposeful and other
times the result of lack of foresight.199
In the aftermath of the Kardassopoulos decision, scholars
suggested additions to the language of the ECT, specifically to
Art. 45(1), that would have prevented the rise of disputes as
occurred in Yukos.200 By reinforcing Art. 45(1) with language
that clearly requires a signatory to make a declaration if
provisional application is inconsistent with domestic
regulations or to forego the domestic law defense to
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provisional application,201 the preliminary debate addressed
by the Interim Yukos Award would not have been needed as
the language of the treaty would have provided a clear
answer.
The ECT would also benefit from a clearer delineation of
the duration of provisional application for countries like
Belarus and Russia (prior to its withdrawal), which have
signed but not ratified the ECT.202 In the aftermath of the
Kardassopoulos decision, scholars proposed such language,
and if this language had been present in the ECT at the time
of the Yukos dispute, a substantial portion of the Tribunal’s
decision would have been unnecessary.203 This language
would resolve the indefiniteness of the ECT’s provisional
application clauses and would “encourage states to either
ratify or express their intent not to be bound by the treaty,”204
the very problem that stimulated the Yukos dispute between
ECT investors and Russia.
A redraft of the treaty or amendments to its provisional
application sections would give investors and host states a
clearer picture of what is expected under the ECT’s use of
provisional application. Those changes would also guide
future tribunals on the intent of the treaty’s drafters.205
CONCLUSION

04/16/2012 17:10:32

201. See id. at 755–56 (suggesting that Article 45(1) be amended with the
language: “If provisional application is inconsistent with a signatory’s
constitution, laws, or regulations, that signatory must make a declaration upon
signature rejecting provisional application pursuant to paragraph 2(a). If the
signatory fails to make this declaration upon signature, the signatory thereafter
waives its rights to assert that provisional application is inconsistent with its
constitution, laws, or regulations.”).
202. Id. at 759.
203. Id. (suggesting that an additional clause be added to Art. 45 with the
language: “If after ___ years following the Treaty’s definitive entry into force a
signatory provisionally applying the Treaty has not expressed its consent to be
bound by the Treaty through ratification, acceptance, or approval, or voluntarily
terminated its provisional application of the Treaty pursuant to Article ___, the
signatory’s provisional application of the Treaty will terminate.”).
204. Id.
205. It is worth noting that it would be difficult to reach an agreement and
possibly not worth the effort. Before renegotiation began, the parties should
examine the costs and potential benefits of clarification of the treaty’s terms.
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The Tribunal’s decision is well-reasoned and supported
by detailed scholarship. Its conclusion that Russia must
provisionally apply the ECT’s investor protection provisions is

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 203 Side A

04/16/2012 17:10:32

7_LAIDLAW FINAL.DOC FINAL

2012]

ECT AND THE YUKOS DISPUTE

3/15/2012 9:05:58 PM

683

in close accord with the plain text on provisional application
in the treaty.206
Regardless of the results of the merits phase of the
arbitration, investors are more likely to focus on the political
risk of investing in Russia after its treatment of Yukos and its
subsequent withdrawal from the ECT.207 Even though the
Yukos Tribunal afforded protection to prior investments
continuing long after Russia’s withdrawal, it cannot extend
this protection to new investments made in Russia after the
withdrawal.208
Despite the risky climate for foreign
investment in Russia’s energy sector, there are many
opportunities for investment.209 To avoid future disputes
related to multilateral investment treaties, treaties should be
updated to address in detail the scope and limitations of
provisional application.210
The Tribunal’s Interim Award signals that Russia is no
longer immune from the effects of the investment protection
treaties it has signed.211 Allowing the Tribunal to move
forward to the merits phase is an important step towards
fairness in Russian investment disputes, and the release of
the decision is a move towards transparency in Russian
dispute settlements.212 However, despite an initial victory for
the claimants, “it is already clear that complete victory for
either the former Yukos owners or the Russian Federation is
unlikely”213 because of the high cost of complex arbitration,
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 203 Side A
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206. Giorgetti, supra note 125 (citing OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW
1238 (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (noting that
affirmation of a treaty may mandate provisional application)).
207. Riley, supra note 184, at 38. See also Daniel R. Sieck, Note, Confronting
the Obsolescing Bargain: Transacting around Political Risk in Developing and
Transitioning Economies through Renewable Energy Foreign Direct Investment,
33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 319, 321–323 (2010) (“Political risk is an everpresent danger of [foreign direct investment] that is especially profound in the
energy sector . . . . When investors operate in foreign legal regimes, they face an
increased level of general business risk uncommon in domestic ventures.”).
208. See supra Part I.
209. Waltrip, supra note 1, at 586 (noting that capacity and technology
updates needed by Russia will cost at least fifty billion dollars over the next ten
years, and that the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources plans to encourage
development of new oil fields and the creation of tax breaks for new exploration
in encouragement of further development).
210. See Belz, supra note 28, at 759.
211. Rubins and Nazarov, supra note 57, at 113.
212. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 375.
213. Golobolov and Tangega, supra note 106, at 647.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 203 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

7_LAIDLAW FINAL.DOC FINAL

684

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

3/15/2012 9:05:58 PM

[Vol. 52

the small possibility of collecting a judgment from Russia,
and the public relations disaster that has occurred for all
parties.214
Before the Tribunal’s decision in 2006, the Secretary
General of the Energy Charter Secretariat, Andre Mernier,
lamented the uncertainty of “the extent to which provisional
application of the [ECT] creates firm legal rights and
obligations for Russia . . . under international law.”215 The
Yukos Tribunal clarified a great deal of that uncertainty,
while the Yukos Interim Award will serve as a strong
foundation for holding host nations accountable for protection
of investments made during provisional application of the
ECT; however, the addition of new, clear language with
respect to provisional application would be the best
foundation for preventing future disputes.
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214. Id. The tribunal has attracted much attention in the media, both for the
exposure of what seems to be a Russian coup of the foreign energy
infrastructure, and for the immense monetary amount of the claimants’
demand. See Ross, supra note 121, at 11.
215. Andre Mernier, Sec’y Gen., Energy Charter Secretariat, Speech to the
International Conference on Energy Security: the Energy Charter and
International Energy Security, Moscow (Mar. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=59&id_article=75&L=0 (cited in Belz,
supra note 28, at 729).

